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WHAT IS A SAFE PLACE TO WORK UNDER THE F.E.L.A.
A. PAUL FUNKHOUSER*
A railroad's duty to furnish its employees a reasonably safe place to
work is nowhere found in the language of the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act.' The duty obtained at common law in employer-employee
relationships generally' and it is from this source, by judicial decision that
the doctrine has become an integral part of the FIELA.' As with the
question of negligence generally, fulfillment or breach of the duty is a
federal question to be determined by federal decisions, unfettered by
local rules of law. Erie v. Tompkins' in all its ramifications has no
application.5
For thirty odd years, commencing with the passage of the present
act in 1908, employee recovery under the FELA based upon the em-
ployer's failure to furnish a safe place to work was, in most instances,
potentially restrained and often thwarted by the employer invoking a
second judicially created rule, that of assumption of risk. That doctrine,
where applicable, insulated the carrier from its own negligence by
reason of the employee's continuance in employment. However, in 1939
the Act was amended6 and "every vestige . . . of assumption of risk was
obliterated from the law . . . ."' Today employer liability hangs on two
questions, negligence and proximate cause, there being no remaining de-
fense in bar as the act upon its passage abolished the fellow-servant rule
and substituted comparative negligence for the strict rule of contributory
negligence. Naturally with the 1939 Amendment the duty to furnish
a reasonably safe place to work attained a vigor previously unknown.
With this background it will be the purpose of this article to analyze
some of the more recent court decisions in an effort to determine what
is a safe place to work within the Act in several of the more frequently
arising factual situations.
CLEARANCE-STRUCTURES AND OBSTRUCTIONS
While the 1939 Amendment abolished in toto assumption of risk,
some courts inaccurately have continued to pay lip service to the doctrine
in situations of non-negligence. This confusion is graphically depicted in
instances of dose clearance which involve risks inherent in railroading.
Thus, as recently as 1947, prejudicial error was found in a trial court's
* General Attorney, Norfolk & Western Railway Company, Roanoke, Virginia.
3 35 STAT. 65 (1908) (as amended) 45 U.S.C. §51 (1946).
2 Choctaw, Oklahoma and Gulf R.R. v. McDade, 191 U.S. 64 (1903) ; Patton
v. Texas and Pacific Ry., 179 U.S. 658 (1901); Union Pacific Ry. v. O'Brien,
161 U.s. 451 (1896).
3 Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
6 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §54 (1946).
7 Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
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unqualified instruction that the plaintiff could not be held to have as-
sumed the risk of his employment.' Although the doctrine was not made
an issue in the pleadings and there was no basis for such an instruction,
the reviewing court, nevertheless, was of the opinion, in spite of the 1939
Amendment, that assumption of risk remained as an affirmative defense
to those dangers in employment "which are naturally inherent in the
business and are not in whole or in part caused by or the result of de-
fendant's negligence." At the risk of seeming overly exacting, it is sub-
mitted that the court erred in conceding that assumption of risk may be
interjected in any form, however disguised. While it is true in a lay
sense that the employee "assumes the risk" of hazards not due to
negligence, there is no reason, in such situations, to invoke a defense
which presupposes negligence where no negligence exists. Indeed, any
instruction on assumption of risk is bound to create confusion and likely
will be reversible error.' This distinction is frequently manifest in clear-
ance cases where often structures of prescribed standards based on engi-
neering practices are in issue.
A close clearance with its accompanying danger is not in itself
sufficient to warrant a finding of negligence." ° In fact, pre-1939 decisions
have announced the rule that courts will not prescribe standards nor
leave the location of permanent structures along a line of railroad, such
as mail cranes, semaphores, switchstands and overhead bridges, which
involve engineering questions, to the uncertain and varying judgment of
juries." These opinions recognize the practical concept that construction
and maintenance of such structures with reference to the track of a
railroad are management prerogatives to be decided in light of the con-
venient and economical use of the railroad and the accommodation of its
traffic. Of course, it logically follows that those structures and condi-
tions existing as part of such engineering scheme do not involve any
question of negligence, in the absence of manifest errors in construction,
s See Ellis v. Union Pacific R.R., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N.W. 2d 921 (1947).
The ambiguity and confusion in the phrase "assumption of risk" is recognized
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion to Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., supra, note 7. See also Owens v. Union Pac. R.R., 319 U.S. 715, 720
(1943) where Mr. Justice Rutledge stated: "and assumption of risk took over also,
in misguided appellation, large regions of the law of negligence. What in fact was
absence from departure of due care by the defendant came to be labelled
'assumption of risk.'
9 Perrett v. Southern Pacific Co., 73 Cal. 2d 30, 165 P. 2d 751 (1946).
"o Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401 (1931); Hall v. Chicago
& N. W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E. 2d 77 (1955); Conkey v. New York Central
R. R., 136 N.Y.S. 2d 189 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
11 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Powe, supra, Note 10; Delaware,
Lackawanna and Western R. R. v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7 (1929); Toledo, St. L. &
W. R. R. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165 (1928); Hylton v. Southern Ry., 87 F. 2d 393
(6th Cir. 1937) ; cert. denied, 301 U.S. 699 (1937); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v.
Riley, 145 Fed. 137 (7th Cir. 1906) ; Tennessee Central Ry. v. Shacklett, 24 Tenn.
App. 563, 147 S.W. 2d 1054 (1941).
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patent to an ordinary observer.12 And, in spite of the 1939 Amendment
and the apparent present disposition of the Supreme Court to allow all
cases to go to the jury, there is respectable authority to the effect that
these former decisions reflect the present state of the law.
1 3
However, it would be folly to consider a legal principle which cir-
cumvents the jury function, separate and apart from recent Supreme
Court decisions which have modified established precedents demarcating
the role of judge and jury in making the vital dispositive determination
of the presence or absence of negligence in cases arising under the
FELA. For example, it is a rule of common law that where proved
facts give equal support to each of two inconsistent inferences, judgment,
as a matter of law, must go against the party upon whom rests the
burden of proof. 4
This rule was approved by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania
R. R. v. Chamberlain,5 an action arising under the FELA, to recover
damages for the death of a brakeman. Of controlling importance was
evidence of a crash caused by a collision of cars in defendant's yard.
This evidence supported both the inference that the string of cars the
decedent was riding was in a collision and also that the collision oc-
curred in a part of the yard remote from decedent's whereabouts. Under
such circumstances, the court held:
We, therefore, have a case belonging to that class of
cases where proven facts give equal support to each of two
inconsistent inferences; in which event, neither of them being
established, judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the
party upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these
inferences as against the other, before he is entitled to recover.
Consider this principle in light of the recent case of Lavender v.
Kurn"6 which involved the unwitnessed death of a switchtender in yards
owned by the Illinois Central Railroad Company. There was no direct
evidence as to how the deceased met his death. Furthermore, though
evidence of the decedent's duties and certain physical facts as to the con-
dition of the area in which he met his death was in dispute, the evidence
as a whole taken most favorably to petitioner gave rise, it is submitted,
to no more than speculation as to whether decedent was murdered or
struck by a mail hook from a passing train. In delivering the opinion of
the court Mr. Justice Murphy discloses "... there was evidence from
which it might be inferred that the end of the mail hook struck Haney in
12 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Riley, supra, Note 11.
13 Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 137 F. 2d 527 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Rashaw
v. Central Vt. Ry., Inc., 133 F. 2d 253 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Finnegan v. Monongahela
Connecting R. R., 378 Pa. 63, 108 A. 2d 321 (1954) ; Sprankle v. Thompson,
243 S. NV. 2d 510 (Mo. 1951).
14 White v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 220 N.Y. 131, 115 N.E. 439 (1917) ; McGrath
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97, 94 S.W. 872 (1906).
152 88 U.S. 333 (1933).
10327 U.S. 645 (1946).
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the back of the head ... " Thereafter he adds "... there are facts
from which it might reasonably be inferred that Haney was murdered."
Having emphasized the reasonableness of drawing inconsistent inferences
from the evidence, one supporting liability and the other non-liability,
the opinion concludes:
We hold, however, that there was sufficient evidence of
negligence ... to justify submission of the case to the jury ....
It is no answer to say the jury's verdict involved specula-
tion and conjecture. Whienever facts are in dispute or the
evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different
inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required
on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by
choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable in-
ference . . . . But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis
for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve
whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion.
The language of the unanimous opinion in Ellis v. Union Pacific
R. R.," is further illustrative of the Supreme Court's apparent inclination
to submit to the jury cases which at common law would have been de-
cided for the defendant as a matter of law. This was an action for
damages by an engine foreman who sustained personal injuries as a
result of being crushed between a building and a moving railroad car.
While the conflicting evidence most favorable to petitioner appears to
justify a finding that petitioner was not furnished a safe place to work,
the language of the court indicates that, even in instances where the
facts are uncontroverted, so long as the evidence supports the inference
drawn, the verdict may not be set aside although from such undisputed
evidence other conflicting inferences equally consistent could hare been
made. Thus, the opinion states:
the choice of conflicting versions of the way the accident hap-
pened, . .. the inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted
as well as controverted facts, are questions for the jury ...
Once there is a reasonable basis in the record for concluding
that there was negligence which caused the injury, it is irele-
vant that fair minded men might reach a different conclusion.
For then it would be an invasion of the jury's function for an
appellate court to draw contrary inferences or to conclude that
a different conclusion would be more reasonable. (Italics
added)
Decisions such as Lavender and Ellis require a word of caution
before assertion tat any given factual situation will result in a verdict
for defendant as a matter of law. Indeed, it is only reasonable that state
and lower federal courts have accepted as a mandate the proposition that
17 329 U.S. 649 (1947). See also Gill v. Pennsylvania R. R., 201 F. 2d 718
(3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), which recognizes the modifica-
tion of common law principles in the Kurn and Ellis cases. Cf. Labonte v. New
York, N.H. & H. R.R. 131 N.E. 2d 203 (Mass. 1956).
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directed verdicts in favor of defendants in cases arising under the FELA
are no longer tolerated. In the recent case of Atlarntic Coast Lin." '. R.
v. Floyd,"8 Judge Dobie, speaking for a unanimous court, had the fol-
lowing to say:
The Supreme Court has made crystal clear its manifest
unwillingness to sanction the taking of cases under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act away from the jury by directed
verdicts in favor of defendant railroads.
While it is true that a close clearance per se does not necessarily
indicate negligence, it follows from the Ellis case, where in addition fo
close clearance, inadequate warning and deception were inferred, that a
close clearance coupled with any superadded element will support an,
inference of negligence likely sufficient to take the case to the jury.'"
And, of course, if it can be shown that the structure or appliance was
placed at or near railroad tracks when no practical necessity existed for
the maintenance of the hazard at that location, close clearance per se
spells negligence.
20
Nor is the fact that the obstruction was constructed and maintained
in accordance with the custom and usage of railroads generally or in
accordance with the clearance specifications announced by the Association
of American Railroads conclusive of the exercise of due care.2 Like-
wise, the testimony of experts with respect to safer methods used on other
railroads is admissible to produce an evidentiary basis for a jury finding
that a safer method should have been used.2 Further, despite the estab-
lished principle that the standard of diligence is foresight, not hindsight,
and the classic rule that negligence cannot be judged after the occur-
rence,23 there is authority to the effect that, although a certain maneuver
was being performed in the usual and customary manner, if further pre-
cautions "were possible" there is an evidentiary basis for a jury finding
of negligence. 24 Similarly, evidence that fellow employees, for humani-
18 227 F. 2d 820 (4th Cir. 1955).
10 Stanczak v. Pennsylvania R. R., 174 F. 2d 43 (7th Cir. 1949); Beattie
v. Monongahela Ry., 122 F. Supp. 803 (W. D. Pa. 1954); Hall v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E. 2d 77 (1955).
20 Rouse v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 349 Il1. App. 139, 110, N.E. 2d
266 (1953) ; James v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 199 S.C. 45, 18 S.E. 2d.616 (1942) ;
Werner v. Illinois Central R. R., 309 Ill. App. 292, 33 N. E. 2d 121 (1941), ree'd
on other grounds, 379 Ill. 559, 42 N.E. 2d 82 (1942).
21 Rouse v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., supra, Note 20; Bly v. Southern
Ry., 183 Va. 162, 31 S.E. 2d 564 (1944), affd., 183 Va. 406, 32 S.E. 2d 659
(1945). Cf. Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 317 U.S. 481 (1943).
22 Margevich v. Chicago & N. NV. Ry., I Ill. App. 2d 162, 116 N.E. 2d
914 (1953); cert. denied, 348 U.S. 861 (1954).
23 SHERMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE, Section 24 (rev. ed. 1941); Southern
Ry. v. Harpe, 223 Ind. 124, 58 N.E. 2d 346 (1944).
24 Boston and Maine R. R. v. Meech, 156 F. 2d 109 (1st Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U. S. 763, (1946). Cf. Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 190 F. 2d
744 (5th Cir. 1951). Cf. Pitrowski v. New York, C & St. L. R.R., 4 IIl. 2d 125,
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tarian reasons alone, customarily gave warning of a particular close clear-
ance has been held sufficient to create a duty to warn notwithstanding
the carrier contention that the law does not permit employees "to create a
duty on each other without the knowledge and approval of the em-
ployer.")25
FOREIGN OBJECTS AND OBSTUCrIONS
A fruitful source of litigation under the FELA involves injuries to
employees as a result of stepping, stumbling or slipping into, over or upon
foreign objects or obstructions upon railroad premises. The decided cases
in this field are myriad and extend the carrier's duty of care the length
and breadth of its operations. Indeed, the continuing duty to furnish a
reasonably safe place to work is not "relieved by the fact the employee's
work at the place in question is fleeting or infrequent." 26 The one
limiting factor lies in answer -to the question whether the point of accident
was a work-place, which is to be judged by foresight. For if the carrier
had no reason to anticipate the injured employee would have occasion in
the course of his duties to be in the area of injury, of course, there can be
no duty in the above respect.2 7
Railroad property by its very nature and purpose contemplates the
occasional presence of litter and foreign objects. As long as freight is
hauled in open-top cars, and as long as railroad premises continue to
attract trespassers, a lump of coal and debris of varied sorts will be
found periodically along rights of way. Accordingly, it is generally held
that the defendant must have knowledge of the hazard on its premises,
either actual or constructive, to -be guilty of negligence in failing to
warn of or remove the danger. Typical of numerous decisions is Waller
v. Northern Pacific Co.28 There a switching crew foreman sought
damages for personal injuries sustained while boarding a moving train at
night as a result of slipping upon an unseen stick. The court, in re-
versing a judgment for the plaintiff, reaffirmed the general rule applicable
to this type of litigation:
The rule is firmly established that where plaintiff slips upon
an object upon the premises of the defendant, plaintiff must, in
order to establish liability, show that the defendant or his agent
put the dangerous object there, or that they knew or by the
122 N.E. 2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd., 6 I11 App. 2d 495, 128 N.E. 2d 577
(1955).
25 Timmerman v. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 362 Mo. 280, 241 S.V.
2d 477 (1951).
26Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
2 7 Kenney v. Boston and Maine R. R., 92 N.H. 495, 33 A. 2d 557 (1943).
Cf. Pauly v. McCarthy, 166 P. 2d 501 (Utah 1946), reversed, 330 U.S. 802 (1947).
28 178 Ore. 274, 166 P. 2d 488 (1946). See also Webb v. Illinois Central
R. R., 288 F. 2d 257 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 24 U.S.L. Week 3280 (U.S.
April 23, 1956) (No. 741); Viront v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 91 F. Supp.
854 (E.D. Ohio 1950).
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exercise of reasonable diligence could have known that it was
there and failed to exercise diligence to remove it. (p. 498)
In application of this rule, proof of knowledge, either actual or
constructive, on the part of the defendant is not essential in instances
where an inference can be established that the obstruction negligently
was placed on carrier premises by its employees or agents. And such an
inference may arise where there is no evidence that licensees or strangers
have access to defendant's premises and the hazard causing injury is a tool
or object which is in proved general use by defendant's employees.29 On
the other hand, in the absence of negligence, even though it may be
demonstrated that a foreign substance probably was deposited on defend-
ant's premises through the agency of its employees or instrumentalities,
proof of knowledge and opportunity to remove the danger remain es-
sential to plaintiff's case."0 However, the presence of a hole, having the
appearance of being "worn down," in an otherwise hard, smooth surface
maintained for the use of switchmen adjacent to a railroad track, will
support an inference that the condition had been present sufficiently long
to cast a duty upon the carrier to have discovered and remedied the peril."'
Another type of case in which the alleged defect causing injury has
been brought about admittedly by defendant's employees, thereby satis-
fying any requirement of knowledge, is Seaboard Air Line R. R. v.
Gentry.32 Plaintiff complained of being thrown to the ground while
boarding a moving caboose due to insecurely packed ballast. Of course,
the only issue for determination was defendant's negligence and proximate
cause. The court held, however, that the issue as to whether the ballast
was properly placed and preserved was an engineering question which the
courts generally trusted to experts. Thus, the allegations of the declara-
tion were not sufficient to charge the defendant with negligence.
33
In suits where it is unknown how the peril arose and there is evi-
dence of trespassing in the area, the defendant's timely knowledge of the
29 Butz v. Union Pacific R. R., 120 Utah 185, 233 P. 2d 332 (1951) ; Clark
v. Chicago & N. NV. Ry., 226 Minn. 375, 33 N.W. 2d 484 (1948); Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. v. Flechtner, 300 Fed. 318 (6th Cir. 1924). Cf. Missouri P. R. R. v.
Zolliecoffer, 209 Ark. 559, 191 S. W. 2d 587 (1946).
30 Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Pool, 263 S.W. 2d 582 (Tex. 1953).
31 Lofy v. Southern Pacific Co., 129 Cal. 2d 459, 277 P. 2d 423 (Dist. Ct.
1955); Cf. Hatfield v. Thompson, 252 S.W. 2d 534 (Mo. 1952) where it was
admitted the hole had existed only "since the day before plaintiff was injured,
and plaintiff does not contend its existence for that length of time would charge
defendant with knowledge."
3246 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
33 Cf. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. v. Gill, 217 F. 2d 195 (5th Cir.
1954) where there was evidence of no necessity for wooden runners, used for
motor cars, to be elevated above brakeman's pathway and defendant failed to
keep ballast filled in between runners. The issue of causation was held to be
for the jury. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Gunter, 229 F. 2d 842 (5 Cir.
1956).
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hazard is a prerequisite to liability.34 Moreover, in instances where testi-
mony to the effect the obstruction was placed on defendant's premises by
an outsider is uncontradicted, liability will ensue only if the defendant had
actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard and sufficient time to re-
move it." Of course, if there is no evidence as to how or when the
danger arose, there is no basis for liability."8 And as in negligence cases
generally, conflicting evidence is for jury determination.37
No discussion of this phase of the FELA should fail to mention the
recent decision of Marcades v. New Orleans Terninal Co. 8 This was
an action for damages by a yard crew switchman who sustained injuries
as a result of stepping down from a tank car onto "a large piece of brick
or clinker," partially embedded in the ground. The court, after paying
lip service to established principles, i.e., the Act does not make the em-
ployer an insurer of the safety of its employees and the basis of liability is
negligence, stated:
An inference of negligence may be drawn from the fact that
the brick or clinker on which plaintiff sprained his ankle was
found in the walkway between the tracks where members of
train crews would be expected to step on and off trains during
switching operations.
This decision obviously imposes liability solely upon the existence of a
foreign object, without regard to defendant's knowledge or opportunity
to remove it. As such, despite the court's protestations, it makes the
carrier an insurer of the employee's working place and provides for
compensation without fault. The opinion disregards the established com-
mon law principle that the carrier remains entitled to a presumption of
lack of knowledge of the hazard, even after proof of its existence.3 9
Accordingly, it is submitted that this decision is antithetical to the many
opinions on this subject and is entitled to no weight as precedent.4
The duty to furnish a reasonably safe place to work under the
FELA is continuous and non-delegable and follows the master even
though the servant is sent upon the premises of another to do his work.41
34 Waller v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., 178 Ore. 274, 166 P. 2d 488
(1946).
350'Brien v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 360 Mo. 229, S.W. 2d 690
(1950).
36 Thompson v. Thompson, 362 Mo. 73, 240 S. V. 2d 137 (1951). Cf. Loftin
v. Howard, 82 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1955).
37 Viront v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 91 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Ohio 1950).
38 Ill F. Supp. 650 (E.D. La. 1953).
39 St. Louis, I. M. & R. R. v. Ingram, 124 Ark. 298, 187 S.W. 452 (1916),
aff'd. per curiam, 244 U.S. 647 (1917); Hawkins v. Clinchfield R. R., 37 Tenn.
App. 529, 266 S.W. 2d 840 (1953).
40 See Webb v. Illinois Central R. R., 288 F. 2d 257 (7th Cir. 1955), cert.
granted, 24 U.S.L. Week 3280 (U.S. April 23, 1956) (No. 741) which criticizes
the opinion in Marcades v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 111 F. Supp. 650 (E. D.
La. 1953).
41 Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis v. Fitzjohn, 165 F. 2d 473 (8th Cir 1948);
Porter v. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 397 Ill. App. 645, 65 N. E. 2d 31 (1946).
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The absence of ownership and lack of control over the premises on
which the injury occurs does not absolve the defendant from liability,
the theory being that the master should not require his employees to per-
form their duties at known dangerous places. Of course, once the duty
of the master to furnish a reasonably safe place to work on third party
premises has been established, the principles governing such cases are the
same as if the injury occurred upon carrier owned and controlled
property.42
WEATHER CONDrrioNS
As railroad companies by their nature extend over wide geographical
areas and require, for efficiency of operations, extensive outside activity on
the part of employees, it has become an accepted rule that carriers are
not subject to liability for injuries resulting from temporary climatic
conditions disconnected from other circumstances. 3 This principle ac-
knowledges the carriers' lack of control over the vagaries of the weather
and requires a degree of care no greater than the ability to perform.
However, within the confines of railroad yards, which are constantly
frequented by employees, the master is required to prevent a hazardous
accumulation of snow and ice. In Fort Worth and Denver City R. R. v.
Smith,44 this obligation is summarized as follows:
It is a general rule that a railway company is not liable to
its employees for injuries resulting from climatic conditions,
such as ice and snow; but within its yard limits it must exercise
a degree of care commensurate with the risks to prevent the ac-
cumulation of snow and ice in such quantity, form, and loca-
tion as to be a menace to the safety of its employees working in
its yards.
Of course, the existence or non-existence of the duty varies with the
factual situation. For instance, where a death occurred allegedly due to
slipping on the sill step of a snow-covered gondola and the evidence dis-
closed a slight snowfall had ceased less than two hours prior to the acci-
dent, the court held no duty existed on the part of the railroad company
to remove the snow from the area of the deceased's employment.45 On
the other hand, in an action for injuries sustained from a fall on ice near
a switch in a busy section of defendant's yards, the icy condition having
42 Kaminski v. Chicago River & Indiana R. R., 200 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir. 1952);
Brock v. Gulf, Mobile & 0. R. F., 270 S. W. 2d 827 (Mo. 1954); Hawkins v.
Clinchfield F_. R., 37 Tenn. App. 529, 266 S.W. 2d 840 (1953); Ericksen v.
Southern Pacific Co., 39 Cal. 2d 374, 246 P. 2d 642 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
897 (1952); Butz v. Union Pacific R. R., 120 Utah 185, 233 P. 2d 332 (1951);
Small v. Ralston-Purina Co., 202 S. W. 2d 533 (St. L. Ct. App. Mo. 1947).
43 Raudenbush v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 160 F. 2d 363 (3rd Cir. 1947);
McGivern v. Northern Pacific R. R., 132 F. 2d 213 (8th Cir. 1942).
44206 F. 2d 667 (5th Cir. 1953). See also Anderson v. Elgin, Joliet and
Eastern Ry., 227 F. 2d 91 (7th Cir. 1955); Detroit, T. & I. R. R. v. Banning,
173 F. 2d 752 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 815 (1949); Kansas, Oklahoma
& Gulf Ry. v. McAnally, 208 Okla. 497, 257 P. 2d 271 (1952).4 0 Raudenbush v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 160 F. 2d 363 (3d Cir. 1947)
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been known to defendant over eight hours before the accident, it was
held an issue for the jury whether the defendant was negligent in failing
to take steps to remove the ice in spite of the apparently uncontradicted
testimony that the storm was in progress at the time of the accident and
any remedial steps would have been futile until it ceased.46 Furthermore,
if the carrier should have anticipated in advance a hazardous icy con-
dition which could have been corrected by safeguards such as sand or salt,
it is likely that such safeguards will be required.4" Of course, outside the
area of yards, a carrier has no duty to clear ice and snow from its right
of way at points where the carrier could not anticipate an erployee would
be required to be in the course of his duties.
48
Normally, an experienced employee assigned to work during ad-
verse weather will be held to be the best judge of his own endurance. 49
However, once the master coerces continued exposure or proscribes pro-
tective measures, liability for injury from either uncommon cold5" or
unusual heat51 likely will ensue. Also, prompt efforts to render assistance
to employees perilously exposed to such elements, including medical at-




At common law it is established that the rule imposing liability on
employers for not providing a safe place to work has only a modified
application, if, indeed, any application to those cases where the employee
who is injured is himself engaged to render a dangerous place safe. This
principle is firmly embedded in the decisions construing the FELA either
as an exception to the master's duty to furnish its servants a reasonably
safe place to work or as an adaptation of that duty to a unique factual
situation which results in a failure to give to such places the amount of
safety the same degree of care would give to a permanent working place.
A leading case in this field is Houston's Adm'x. v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry.,53 where it is stated:
46 Anderson v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry., 227 F. 2d 91 (7th Cir. 1955; cf.
Mirabile v. New York Central R.R., 230 F. 2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956).
47 Fugazzi v. Southern Pacific Co., 208 F. 2d 205 (9th Cir. 1953); Skidmore
v. Baltimore and Ohio R. M., 167 F. 2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S.
816 (1948).
4 8 Burtis v. Freeman, 77 Col. 120, 235 Pac. 342 (1925).
49 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Waterhouse, 223 S.W. 2d 654 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex.
1949); Cf. Beamer v. Virginian Ry., 181 Va. 650, 26 S.E. 2d 43 (1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 763 (1944).
50 O'Brien v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 329 Ill. App. 382, 68 N. E. 2d 638
(1946). Cf. Heeb v. New York Central R. R., 325 Mich. 490, 39 N.W. 2d 44
(1949).
51 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Waterhouse, 223 S.W. 2d 654 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex.
1949).
52Andbrson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 333 U.S. 821 (1948); Szabo v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A. 2d 562 (Ct. Err. & App. N.J. 1945).
53 123 Va. 290, 96 S.E. 270 (Va. 1918). See also Payne v. Baltimore and Ohio
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The rule that it is the duty of the master to use ordinary
care to provide a reasonably safe place in which the servant is
to work does not generally apply where the servant is sent to
make repairs in order to render the place safe.
Of course, if, inherent in the repair of dangerous places, there are
latent dangers known to the master and unknown to the servant, the
duty to warn becomes imperative. 4 Likewise, the presence of open and
obvious hazards apparent alike to master and servant casts no such duty."
CRIMINAL AcTS
A long line of decisions under the FELA deal with the carrier's
duty to render its employees' working places safe from the intentional
assaults or criminal acts of fellow employees. These decisions establish
the principle that the master is liable for such conduct only when its
employees acted within the scope of their employment and in furtherance
of the employer's business. 6 Under this theory, liability of the master
is vicarious in that the negligence of the offender must be imputed to the
employer under the doctrine of respondeat superor. The decisions sup-
porting this view have relied principally upon the leading decision of
Dazts v. Green5" which involved the wanton and wilful killing of an
employee by a fellow worker. A judgment for the plaintiff was re-
versed by the Supreme Court and Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
court, said:
The ground on which the Railroad Company was held
was that it had negligently employed a dangerous man with
notice of his characteristics, and that the killing occurred in the
course of the engineer's employment. But neither allegations
nor proof present the killing as done to further the master's
business, or as anything but a wanton and wilful act done to
satisfy the temper or spite of the engineer. Whatever may be
the law of Mississippi, a railroad company is not liable for such
an act under the statutes of the United States. The only sense
in which the engineer was acting in the course of his employ-
ment was that he had received an order from Green which it
was his duty to obey-in other words that he did a wilful act
R. I., 35 Ill. App. 186, 114 N.E. 2d 323 (1953); Pritchard v. Thompson, 348
Mo. 832, 156 S.V. 2d 652 (1941).
54 Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Howell, 165 F. 2d 135 (8th Cir. 1948)
Pritchard v. Thompson, supra, Note 53.
G5 Cheffey v. Pennsylvania R. R., 79 F. Supp. 252 (E. D. Pa. 1948).
51 Atlantic Coast Line I. P. v. Southwell, 275 U. S. 64 (1927); Hoyt v.
Thompson, 174 F. 2d 284 (7th Cir. 1949); Sheaf v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S.
M. P_ t, 162 F. 2d 110 (8th Cir. 1947); Lanners v. Atchison, Topeka & S. F.
Ry., 344 Ill. App. 125, 99 N.E. 2d 705 (1951) ; Young v. New York Central 11 R.,
88 Ohio App. 352, 88 N.E. 2d 220 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 986 (1950);
Zoccano v. Long Island I. R., 298 N. Y. 553, 81 N.E. 2d 96 (1948); Osment v.
Pitcairin, 349 Mo. 137, 159 S.V. 2d 666 (1941), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 792 (1943).
57260 U.S. 349 (1922).
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wholly outside the scope of his employment while his employ-
ment was going on.
As recently as 1947 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that a complaint which alleged injuries as a result of an unprovoked
attack by a fellow employee, known to have been quarrelsome and vicious
for many years, did not, without more, state any genuine issue of negli-
gence." Indeed, there is logic in this conclusion as the statute imposes
liability only for damages which result "in whole or in part from the
negligence of . .. officers, agents, or employees" of the carrier. Certainly
a criminal act prompted solely by personal malice and not performed in
furtherance of the employer's business can hardly be said to be done in
one's capacity as officer, agent or employee. Accordingly, under the more
frequently occurring factual situations the carriers have in the past
successfully defended claims of this type.
However, the recent Supreme Court decision of Lillie v. Thomp-
son,5 9 which has been the subject of conflicting interpretation in the lower
courts, has brought about a re-examination of heretofore established
principles. The case involved a brutal criminal assault by an outsider
upon a 22-year-old female telegraph operator, who worked alone at
night in a small shanty situated in an isolated part of defendant's rail-
road yards. The carrier had reason to know that the yards were fre-
quented by dangerous characters but had failed to take protective measures
for the plaintiff's safety. In reversing a judgment for defendant based
upon the principle that the law does not permit recovery for the inten-
tional or criminal acts of either a fellow employee or an outsider, the
court stated:
Petitioner alleged in effect that respondent was aware of con-
ditions which created a likelihood that a young woman per-
forming the duties required of petitioner would suffer just such
an injury as was in fact inflicted upon her. That the foreseeable
danger ws from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrele-
vant; respondent nonetheless had a duty to make reasonable
provision against it.
Whether this decision must "have limited application to cases of a
similar factual nature" 60 or establishes a new concept of direct recovery-
as distinguished from vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat
supeor-for the acts or omissions of the principal has not been settled.
However, no discussion of this subject should fail to mention the
recent case of Tatham v. Wabash R. R.6" There, in an action involving
injuries sustained by plaintiff as the result of an assault by a fellow em-
as Sheaf v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. R., 162 F. 2d 110 (8th Cir.
1947).
59 332 U.S. 459 (1947).
60 Young v. New York Central R. R., 88 Ohio App. 352, 88 N.E. 2d 220
(1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 986 (1950).
61412 Ill. 568, 107 N.E. 2d 735 (1952). Cf. Kelly v. New York, N. H. &
H. R. R., 138 F. Supp. 82 (D.C. Mass., 1956).
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ployee, the complaint contained charges of negligence on two grounds,
one based upon respondeat superior and the other upon the direct negli-
gence of the master in knowingly employing a dangerous man to work
with plaintiff, thereby creating the hazard which resulted in plaintiff's
injuries. The court summarily disposed of the first ground, finding that
the assault was not made within the scope of employment or in further-
ance of the master's business. As to the second ground, the court, relying
principally upon Lillie v. Thompson, supra, determined that the carrier is
under a duty to protect its employees from foreseeable harm from fellow
employees. After making a penetrating analysis of the Davis case, the
court concluded that the issue of direct negligence was not before that
court and the decision is no precedent for the restricted view that liability
in this type action may be imposed only when the act was done in the
scope of employment and in furtherance of the master's business.
The Tatham case represents another extension of the applicability
of the FELA in one of the few remaining fields where coverage is of
limited application. The decision presently is in conflict with other cases
decided since Lillie v. Thompson and whether its interpretation of Davis
v. Green is correct remains unsettled. 2
DELEGATION OF EMPLOYER DuTY
A carrier's duty to furnish its employees a reasonably safe place to
work under the FELA is continuing and as to its employees non-
delegable."3 Furthermore, Section 564 of the Act provides:
Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the pur-
pose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier
to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall
to that extent be void.
However, carriers often contract with outside firms for the performance
of various services, such as maintenance, repair or construction work.
Moreover, the question frequently arises whether an employee of an
outside company injured while engaged in his employer's work on behalf
of a railroad in furtherance of interstate commerce may maintain a suit
for damages against the carrier under the FELA for the latter's failure
to furnish a reasonably safe place to work.
In instances where it can be shown that the carrier has engaged an
independent contractor to perform services in order to evade the force
and effect of the Act, such arrangement will lie declared void and an
action by the contractor's employee may be maintained against the carrier
under the Act.6" On the other hand, where no such intent can be shown
62 For an interesting discussion of both views, the majority opinion following
the "scope of employment" rule, see Amann v. Northern Pacific Ry., 292 P.
2d 753 (Mont. 1956).
63 Brock v. Gulf, Mobile & 0. R. R., 270 SV. 2d 827 (Mo. 1954) ; Thompson
v. Thompson, 362 Mo. 73, 227 S.V. 2d 690 (1950).
6435 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C., §55 (1946).
65 Erie P. R. v. Marque, 23 F. 2d 664 (6th Cir. 1928) ; Moore v. Industrial
Commission of Ohio, 49 Ohio App. 386, 197 N.E. 403 (1934).
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and claimant's employer is a true independent contractor exercising un-
restrained power of direction as well as exclusive control and supervision
over the work performed, generally there will be no right of recovery
against the railroad under the FELA.6 6 In such instances the carrier,
with respect to employees of a bona fide independent contractor, is under
no duty to furnish a safe place to work.
Unquestionably there is a limit to the functions which may be
delegated by a carrier to an independent contractor. Indeed, it has been
held that carrier duties incident to the discharge of its function as a
common carrier may not be assigned.67 One recent decision, by way of
dictum, has gone so far as to hold that a carrier may not escape liability
under the FELA by assigning to an independent contractor "the ordinary
and necessary maintenance work on track which it used in interstate
commerce."" Notwithstanding, it is submitted that the more recent
cases support the conclusion that a carrier may delegate to an independent
contractor the duty of repair, maintenance and construction of its tracks,
roadbed and appurtenances. Of course, whether there has been a bona
fide delegation of duty will depend upon the facts peculiar to each case.
However, both the repair and construction of a railroad bridge have been
held assignable.6" Similarly, a servant of an independent contractor,
employed to clean out ditches, slope cuts, restore and widen banks and
correct drainage along a carrier's right of way, was denied relief under
the FELA over the contention that such repair, rehabilitation and im-
provement of the roadway and right of way of a railroad is in its nature
non-delegable. 0 The same result has been reached where the independent
contractor was employed to construct new and additional trackage. 1
MISCELLANEOUS
Under the vast body of law bearing upon the general duty of
carriers to furnish employees a reasonably safe working place in cases
arising under the FELA there are, of course, innumerable principles
which have general application and are incapable of classification.
For example, it is established that where the place of work, ma-
66 Del Vecchio v. Pennsylvania R. R., 233 F. 2d (3d Cir. 1956). Dougall
v. Spokane-Portland & S. Ry., 207 F. 2d 843 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U. S. 904 (1954); Norman v. Spokane-Portland & S. Ry., 101 F. Supp. 350 (D.C.
Ore. 1950) ; aff'd., 192 F. 2 d1020 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 945 (1952).
67Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Treadway's Adm'x., 120 Va. 735, 93 S.E.
560 (1917),,cert. denied, 245 U.S. 670 (1918).
68 Miles v. Pennsylvania R. R., 182 F. 2d 411 (7th Cir. 1950).
69Norman v. Spokane-Portland & S. Ry., 101 F. Supp. 350 (D.C. Ore.
1950), aff'd., 192 F. 2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952);
Tinsley v. Massman Construction Co., 270 S.W. 2d 835 (Mo. 1954); Lees v.
Chicago & N. W. K. R., 339 Ill. App. 227, 89 N.E. 2d 418 (1950), reed. on other
grounds, 409 Ill. 536, 100 N.E. 2d 653 (1951).
70 Dougall v. Spokane-Portland & S. Ry., 207 F. 2d 843 (9th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 904 (1954).
71 Miles v. Pennsylvania R. R., 182 F. 2d 411 (7th Cir. 1950).
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chinery or appliances are reasonably safe for the purpose intended, a
servant cannot hold the master liable for injuries resulting from their
inappropriate, improper or unauthorized use."2 The exception to this
rule lies in those instances where the dangerous method or unsafe way
have been chosen habitually to the knowledge of the carrier or such choice
should have been anticipated. Under these circumstances the employer's
failure to take adequate precautions to eliminate the dangerous practice
or to render the unsafe condition reasonably safe will present a jury
issue as to carrier negligence. Further, the employee's conduct in adopting
the hazardous route or method of work will amount to no more than
contributory negligence. 7
While there appears no logical basis to distinguish places of work
from the manner or way of doing work, the recent case of Smith v.
Southern Pacifi Co. 4 must be mentioned. There, the court impliedly
held the employee's voluntary choice of a hazardous place as opposed to
a safe place can, in no instance, amount to more than- contributory
negligence. The language of the opinion seemingly would reach this
result even though the carrier had no knowledge of such choice in the
past or any reason to anticipate such conduct. While the opihion does not
delineate carrier negligence under such circumstances, it apparently is
found in the mere availability of the dangerous place. To the contrary,
under similar circumstances, the court holds the voluntary choice of a
hazardous manner or way of doing work, where the risk of injury is
obvious, amounts to sole negligence on the part of the employee and will
be a defense in bar to any suit under the FELA. Of course, the qualifi-
cation that the risk of injury must be obvious amounts to no more than
finding that the claimant should have realized the danger involved and
consequently the carrier had no reason to anticipate the hazardous choice.
It is submitted that the voluntary choice of either a hazardous place or
manner or way of work, without more, amounts to sole negligence and
the Smith case insofar as it discusses places of work, which is dictum to
the decision, is not in accord with the authorities on which it relies.
The master is under an affirmative duty to promulgate and enforce
reasonable rules and regulations for the safety of employees. 5 Indeed,
the failure to adopt and enforce safety rules in instances where such rules
72 Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co., 120 Ore. 122, 250 Pac. 622 (1926);
Louisville & Nashville P. R. v. Parsons, 213 Ky. 432, 281 S. W. 519 (1926)
McClain v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 34 Ga. 86, 129 S.E. 876 (1925).
7.3 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949) ; Frizzell v. Wabash R. R.,
199 F. 2d 153 (Sth Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 934- (1953); Virginian Ry.
v. Viars, 193 F. 2d 547 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Hampton v. Pacific Electric Ry., 118
Cal. 2d 271, 257 P. 2d 703 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
74 292 P. 2d 66 (Dist. Ct. App., Cal. 1956).
7 5 Lasagra v. McCarthy, 111 Utah 269, 177 P. 2d 734 (1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 829 (194-7); New York Central R. R. v. Verpleatse, 116 Ind. App. 1,
59 N.E. 2d 916 (1945).
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generally have been adopted by the industry may amout to negligence. 76
However, the mere promulgation of a rule does not necessarily take away
from the jury the question whether the employer has exercised the degree
of care legally required of it." On the other hand, an employee's
violation of a rule of general application prescribing broad precautionary
conduct, at best, will amount to contributory negligence, if any negligence
of the employer also contributes in part to the employee's injury.7" To
the contrary, there is authority to the effect that a servant's disregard of
a specific order or positive instruction bars recovery even though the injury
was due as well to the negligence of other employees of the carrier.79
Lastly, it is a rule of general application that the employee has the
right to assume that the carrier has exercised reasonable care to provide
him a safe place to work."0 Furthermore, since the 1939 Amendment,
even though the employee may know his employer has been negligent in
furnishing a safe place to work, the employee will not be held to have
assumed the risks of such danger. Indeed, to render the employer liable
it is sufficient that he should have foreseen that his negligence would
probably result in injury of some kind to some person. It is not necessary
that the particular consequence or type injury be foreseen.8 1
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's manifest unwillingness, continuously evident
in recent years, to permit directed verdicts to prevail in cases arising under
the FELA has abridged the traditional function of trial judges in deter-
mining the presence or absence of negligence. Naturally, it has become
increasingly difficult for the carrier to comply with its continuing duty to
76 Murray v. Atlantic Coast Line R .R., 233 F. 2d 215 (4th Cir. 1956). Schwer
v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 161 Ohio St. 15, 117 N.E. 2d 696 (1954).
77 Healy v. Pennsylvania R. R., 184 F. 2d 209 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 935 (1951); Wright v. Chicago, Rock Island & P. R. R., 94 Neb. 317,
143 N.W. 220 (1913), affd., 239 U.S. 548 (1916).
78 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Garwood, 167 F. 2d 848 (Sth Cir. 1948); Hen-
wood v. Coburn, 165 F. 2d 418 (8th Cir. 1948).
79 Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. R. v. Arnold, 160 F. 2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1947);
Norfolk and Western Ry. v. Riggs, 98 F. 2d 612 (6th Cir. 1938); Gildner v.
Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 90 F. 2d 635 (2d Cir. 1937); Pere Marquette Ry. v.
Haskins, 62 F. 2d 806 (6th Cir. 1933). Cf. Henwood v. Coburn, supra, Note 78.
The present efficacy of the principle that the violation of a specific rule or
order by an injured employee is a defense in bar to his action for damages,
despite concurring negligence of a fellow employee, has been questioned on
the ground that such a violation amounts to assumption of risk, of course, repealed
by the 1939 Amendment. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Co., v. Mely, 219 F. 2d 199 (9th
Cir. 1954); Johnson v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 242 Minn. 130, 64 N.W. 2d
372 (Minn. 1954).
80 Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 190 F. 2d 744- (5th Cir. 1951);
Griswold v. Gardner, 155 F. 2d 333 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725
(1946).
slVirginian Ry. v. Viars, 193 F. 2d 547 (4th Cir. 1952); Stewart v. Balti-
more & Ohio R. R., 137 F. 2d 527 (2d Cir. 1943).
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furnish its employees a reasonably safe place to work under any factual
situation, despite the innovation of every safety device and precaution
modern technology permits within the bounds of practical railroad
operation.
Indeed, the undermining of established common law concepts of
negligence has rendered the Act an anachronism. As Justice Frankfurter
recently stated:82
I deplore this basis of liability because of the injustices
and crudities inherent in applying the common law concepts of
negligence to railroading. To fit the hazards of railroad em-
ployment into the requirements of a negligence action is to
employ a wholly inappropriate procedure-a procedure adequate
to the simple situations for which it was adapted but brutally
unfit for the situations to which the Federal-Employer' Liability
Act requires that it be put. The result is a matter of common
knowledge. Under the guise of suits of negligence, the dis-
tortions of the Act's application have turned it more and more
into a workmen's compensation act...
And, it might be added, there is one remaining essential, inherent in
every workmen's compensation act, presently lacking in the FELA, that
is, a limit to employer liability.
82Stone v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 344 U.S. 407 (1953) (dissenting
opinion).
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